Karl-Heinz Kramer is affiliated to the Department of political science at the South Asia Institute, University of Heidelberg (Germany) and is Nepal related advisor for several institutions and law courts in Germany. Since 1973 he has been engaged in research on modern history, politics and society of Nepal. His books include Das Königtum in der modernen nepalischen Geschichte (VGH, 1981), Nepal: der lange Weg zur Demokratie (Horlemann, 1991), and Ethnizität und nationale Integration in Nepal (Steiner, 1996).He can be reached at makpa.sherpa@nepalresearch.org. He spoke recently with Kamala Sarup. Excerpts:

Q1. Please tell our readers how did you get connected so close to Nepal?

I began my studies of Nepali history, politics and society in 1973 when I met my wife, Lhakpa Doma Sherpa from Solu-Khumbu. I do not see myself as an expert. You never stop learning for the whole of your life; you're always a learner. So, it took until the late 1980s before I felt qualified enough to carefully join discussions on the situation and events in Nepal. Right from the beginning there have been some areas I have been particularly interested in: politics in general, constitutional law, human rights, the question of inclusion of disadvantaged sections of society (janajati groups, dalits, madhesis, women in general), the conception of historiography. These are still the themes I am working on.

Q2. How do you see Nepal after it regained democracy in 1990? Was it an achievement in retrospect?

Of course, the rise and downfall of democracy after 1990 and the Maoist insurgency have become focus points of my studies in recent years, but I always try to understand and explain the issues, developments, standpoints and statements from the before mentioned aspects. The main players behind the current crisis - the leaders of the political parties, the Maoists as well as the king and his army - can only be understood against the background of Nepali history, which is not the glorious history of the current elite with the king at its top as it is explained in the history books, but the opposite, i.e. the history of the disadvantaged and excluded masses. People rarely learn from history, and Nepal is no exception from this lapse. The problem is that Nepal's affairs are still so elite-dominated in every respect. It has only been after the democratization of 1990 that the masses slowly started to articulate themselves and fight for the rights. This, I think, has been the greatest outcome of the 1990 movement.

Q3. Could you please illustrate?

Let me explain this a bit by the example of the self-understanding of monarchy (I choose this political player as it is the most conservative institution and because it has to play a key function for the solution of the current crisis; of course, the party politicians have learnt little as well after the foundation of political parties in the late 1940s).

All of Nepal's Kings up to Gyanendra have claimed that the Nepali monarchy has always done and is still doing everything only for the prosperity of the people. Everybody who has studied a bit of world history knows that this is nonsense.

All monarchs in history have first thought of themselves; they have done everything to extend their influence, their power, and their wealth. Why should the Nepali monarchy be the only exception from this rule? Look into history (not into that of the school-books but into the so far not really written history of the disadvantaged and not participated masses) and find the proof.

These masses are not the people the monarchy and the schoolbooks have been talking or writing about. On the contrary, they have been the victims of royal politics ever since the process of unification of the country was started (only!!) some 250 years ago. (This shall not question the necessity of unification in the 18th century; without this unification Nepal would never have survived as an independent state).

Q4. How do you look at ethnic diversity in Nepal? Do you see ethnic discrimination?

Ethnic diversity is another aspect of this non-inclusive system suffering from its extreme centralization. There are parts of the country (the far and the mid western hill area, the northern Himalayan region as well as parts of the Tarai that have been extremely neglected. There are some intellectual thinkers (e.g. Prakash A. Raj) who take the exclusion of the Bahun and Chhetri castes of the far and mid western hill area as a proof that the claim of the janajati organizations that their ethnic groups are excluded is wrong. The truth is that both arguments are correct: The ethnic groups have been excluded because of their ethnicity, the Hindu castes of western Nepal have been excluded because of their area of habitation. There are hardly any ethnic groups in this area, which is the traditional homeland of the Hindu population.

Q5. What are you opinions about religious affiliation of the state?

The fact that greater sections of society are excluded has nothing to do with religious affiliation. Instead, it has been the fabrication of elite circles around the ruling Shah family who, instead of being proud to be descendants of the Khas and Magar population, which had been settling in western Nepal for thousands of years, constructed their origin from high caste families in foreign India. What nonsense!

This has been part of the misuse of religion to install a highly stratified system of society in support of the ruling circles around the Shah monarchy. It has introduced exclusion and jealousy into the Nepali society, and with growing consciousness and rights awareness it has become part of the reasons for resistance after 1990.

Another example for the misuse of religion for power political reasons has been the definition of the state as a Hindu state. Significantly, it has only been after the intrusion of democratic ideas that the monarchy found it necessary to define the state in this way.

Q6. So you believe that stating Nepal as a Hindu state was a bad idea for the country?

The 1950s were a time of struggle between young but weak political parties and
the traditional institution of monarchy. The latter more and more got the upper hand and for the first time-defined Nepal as a Hindu state with the Panchayati constitution of 1962. It has been one of the greatest shortcomings of the 1990 constitution that it kept up this definition. The confusing arguments of leading politicians and partly also those of intellectuals prove that they misunderstand this term or at least pretend to do so.

Q7. So do you see the relation between Nepal being a Hindu State and the Royal move of October 2002 to fire the elected PM?

The religious affiliation of the King is of minor importance in this context.  I have summarized the main aspects of a Hindu monarchy in an article for a conference that has been organized by Social Science Baha in April 2003 in the following way to explain the background of King Gyanendra's seizure of power in October 2002 (The corresponding book, edited by Deepak Thapa, is currently in print): I have written on this more extensively in my MA thesis (1978) as well as in a small book on Nepalese monarchy (1981). The main aspects can be summarized as follows:

King Gyanendra's self-image is based on some Hindu-political conceptions in the context of monarchy, i.e. dharma and artha. The Hindu knows that he and all other beings are tied to time and universe, and that all beings have to fulfill a very special personal task. The fundamental term in this context is dharma. It contains the whole area of morals, cults, laws and customs, it is related to the castes and classes (jati and varna), and it leads to otherworldly salvation (Hacker 1965: 100).

The traditional Hindu-political treatises separate dharma (moral and religious order) from artha (mundane political order). These two spheres are only connected at one point: in the person of the king (raja). The religious duty of the monarch, his rajadharma, is the exercise of politics (artha) (Klimkeit 1975: 100-119).

In this sense, is the king the upholder and protector of dharma in his realm?

Q8. So what role do you think King is playing now? Rajniti or Rajdharma?

For successful politics, the King has the means of rajaniti at his hands. Niti means "well-behaviour" but it is also used in the sense of "politics" in general. Rajaniti clearly differs from the honest and moral ideals of rajadharma. While rajadharma describes the way a king should behave honestly, is rananiti the way that makes him successful.

Morals and conscientiousness, that stand in the focus of rajadharma, don't play any role in rajaniti, where only the success counts. The four principal means (upaya) of rajaniti are saman (reconciliation, negotiations), danda (punishment, control, authority, assault), dam (donation, gift, bribery), and bheda (splitting, division, betrayal, sowing the seeds of discord among the opponents). Three other means are maya (deceit, fraud), upeksa (neglect, ignorance) and indrajala (accusation, false pretences). The kings of modern Nepal have often fallen back on these means to push their politics through and King Gyanendra's current politics revives this tradition.

Q9. In your opinion, a constitutional monarch and a Hindu monarch cannot coexist?

The political parties with their modern western oriented understanding of democracy
have been the main opponents of Nepal's Hindu monarchs after 1950. This is the reason why all kings since Tribhuvan have fought the political parties by the means of rajaniti.

The modern history and politics of the Kingdom of Nepal can only be understood in this context. The simple transfer of western political conceptions is misleading. Thus, a Hindu monarch can never be a constitutional monarch. He stops to be a Hindu monarch when he becomes a constitutional head of state in a western democratic system.

Q10. How do you look at the role of media organizations especially after 1990? Can they meaningfully play any role for maintaining peace?

I think that media have changed a lot after 1990. This has been one of the most positive outcomes of the 1990 movement. The 1990 constitution guarantees the right to opinion and expression as well as the right to information. This is a verbal mandate for the press. Despite numerous violations of these rights by the state as well as by the Maoists, I would say that the media in general have improved enormously, not only in number but also in circulation and especially in quality.

What bothers me is the fact that there is sometimes fighting below the belt between different media. Let me take the conflict between Kantipur Publications and the Himalayan Times as an example. I don't understand the whole fuss. The Kathmandu Post (partly also Kantipur) and the Himalayan Times are important parts of my daily lecture. I need all of them because I must read different opinions and reports to get to my own interpretation. The variety of opinions is part of a good press. I don't see Indian influence in the way the Himalayan Times is writing.

Another encouraging development is the fact that the disadvantaged sections of society find a growing voice in the media. I still have the impression that the media are dominated mainly by male members of high Hindu castes, as most institutions of Nepal still are. But it is heartening that many of these journalists have already started their intellectual revolution. When I worked on my book on ethnicity and national integration in the early 1990s, I found out that there were hardly any journalists from the higher Hindu castes that showed interest and understanding for themes that had to do with ethnic groups, Dalits, Madhesi or even women in general. This has enormously changed in recent years and this has been confirmed to me by leaders from the janajati groups.

The media should further intensify this to prepare the way for a durable peace. The media can put enormous pressure on those in power and open up the minds of the general public by the demystification of Nepali history, society and culture in a way as I have explained above. In the long run, Nepal needs a strong civil society for the necessary changes, and it is one of the main tasks of the media to help in building it up.

Q11. Do you see any negative side associated with it?

I have also observed some negative developments, especially after the royal take over of October 2002. On the one side, there is the government owned media that had improved a lot after 1990 as well. Nowadays, they are almost as unreadable as they had been during panchayati times with daily uncritical leading reports on the king and other royals as well as on his government and army. On the other side, there are some private papers, that have followed the same scheme like, for example, the People's Review, a weekly that I very much liked to read before October 2002. The media must be critical without any prejudices. It is civil courage and not subversion if journalist, academicians or other members of civil society write well-founded articles in the Nepali media that openly discuss the acts and statements of king, politicians, army or Maoists and that open the people's eyes for the foundations of Nepal's current crisis. Nepal needs such courageous persons and not blind yes-men.

Q12. What responsibility should Non Resident Nepalis take to mobilize support from international community and help resolving this issue? Do you think our Non Resident Nepalis group is not very effective to gather support from international community?

The contribution of NRN to the development of Nepal can be enormous. As a jwain of Nepal, I have been in close touch to the discussions of NRN participation right from the beginning. For the moment I only have some objections that have to do with the political situation in Nepal, and I had asked my friend Ram Thapa, who is our leading committee member from Germany, to mention these objections during the last meeting in Kathmandu. I'm not a Nepali by birth, only by heart; so I should only give advising comments. For the moment I see one big problem: The participation of NRN must be regulated by law, but currently there is no parliament that would be the only institution to pass laws. Royal ordinances based on illegitimate royal steps cannot
be the basis for future NRN participation.

But if Nepal again has a parliament, it should be one of the first steps to participate the NRN. From the first discussions I have had the impression that political circles in Nepal are mainly interested in direct financial investments. This is very shortsighted. Every kind of activity of NRN in Nepal will be a contribution to the economic development, be it that they support educational or health institutions, contribute to the development of their ancestral villages or simply bring in whatever they have gained as special knowledge in foreign countries, etc. In any case, Nepal will benefit from the NRN. What the NRN can do for the moment even without formal legal regulations is that they actively participate in the discussions on the problems and situation in Nepal. Take your own articles that I have read in Nepali journals and papers; I am sure that each of your articles is a contribution to the above-mentioned revolution of mind that is necessary for a peaceful and prosperous future.

Q13.  In the past, the talks between the establishment and the rebels have failed. How do you see the present political crisis in the country?

The talks between the government and the rebels have failed twice because of several reasons. I have already mentioned in the beginning that there must be a willingness of intellectual revolution from all political players. So far, I see hardly any of the established political leaders who are really ready to such fundamental changes. There is still a great difference between their verbal claims and what they do. For example, look into the election manifestos that have been published by the different parties three times in the 1990s. The so important question of inclusion and exclusion that is responsible for dissatisfaction and resistance in modern Nepal is hardly mentioned in these manifestos, and if it is mentioned then you can see from the formulation that the leading politicians have never thought about what they had been writing; there were no ideas how to change the wrong status quo; there were no attempts to look into the socio-historical origins of the crisis. Latest after the elections they forgot everything that had to do with these aspects.

This also becomes clear from the two rounds of dialogues that took place. In the first dislogue in 2001, the government of Sher Bahadur Deuba was still an elected one. Deuba started powerfully into the dialogue with great illusions but without a real program. The Maoists, on the other side had a clear agenda that had to do with all those things I have mentioned in the beginning. This Maoist agenda shook the fundamentals not only of the constitution but also of the established system of non-participation and non-inclusion. Forced by his own party elite as well as by that of the other parties, Deuba had to set up preconditions that collided with the revolutionary mind of the Maoists.

The second dialogue took place after the royal take-over. Lokendra Bahadur Chand already missed the legitimacy to hold talks. He was a mere puppet of the king and could not discuss on the Maoist agenda. When he tried to get the dialogue on with some concessions to the Maoists in the second round of talks, he faced strong opposition from the king's army. In this moment, he was politically dead and he was replaced by another royal puppet, Surya Bahadur Thapa. The latter introduced a government agenda in the third round of talks, but this agenda had nothing to do with the main demands of the Maoists; its formulation was vague and remembered the hollow words of panchayat times respectively the election manifestos of the parties of the 1990s. Under such circumstances the dialogue could only fail once again.

Currently, there is again a lot of talk on the solution of the Maoists conflict but recent developments do not really nurture such hopes. The current procedure of the Maoists is everything else but useful for talks. For months, they abduct children, partly also teachers, to drill them for their matter. In recent weeks, they even have openly
challenged the media. The blockade of the Kathmandu valley, even though it seems to have failed now, has been another negative procedure of the Maoists. The explanation in respect to talks could be that all these are attempts of the Maoists to improve their position before talks start.

The government has been claiming that talks are under preparation. If this is true then one can see again the mistake that has already twice lead to the failure of talks: The government is not willing to hold talks without preconditions. The reason may be that also the current Deuba government is one that is nominated by the King and that is not legitimated by the people. A new constitution that is elaborated by an elected constituent assembly is not only the one and all fundamental demand of the Maoists, it is also more and more discussed among political parties as well as among civil society. It must be taken for sure that a new constitution that is written in this way will further cut royal powers (this is necessary as the misbehaviour of the king in recent years has proved). But King Gyanendra does not want his powers cut compared to the 1990 constitution but he wants a dramatic expansion of his powers in a way that very much reminds of panchayati times. This means that he will do everything that guarantees that changes of the 1990 constitution or even a new constitution can only take place under royal control. In other words: With the king back in sovereignty and executive power (practically also back in legislative power since the country has been run for more than two years by royal ordinances and directions) a new round of dialogue with the Maoists is doomed to failure even before it starts.

The best alternative solution could be a neutral mediation as it has been offered by the UN several times. The Maoists have hinted that they would accept such role of the UN. Within the political parties there are different opinions in this regard, while it seems that the (royal) government and also the palace do not want such kind of UN mediation. I have the impression that again the fear of a further loss of royal powers and changes concerning elite formation and participation are the reasons behind this attitude. From the foreign political point of view one has also to fear that the USA would not agree. They see Nepal's Maoists as international terrorists and they do not want UN interference in their fight against international terrorism, as least as long as George Bush is US president. The USA may have changed their disputed ambassador to Nepal in recent weeks but not their politics.

Q14.  Is Nepal a failed or a collapsed State yet?

Nepal is in a dilemma. The democratic system that has been introduced in 1990 has failed: The monarchy has left its constitutional role and it has seized power; the political parties have not developed along democratic lines and have often misused their powers; the parliaments that had been elected by the people have not been able to introduce urgent legal reforms; the numerous governments have all failed because of personal interests and corruption; the opposition within and without parliament (with the outstanding example of the Maoists) has disregarded democratic rules and has broken the constitution in different ways; the local level may have been upgraded by the Local Development Act of 1999 but there have been no elections on the basis of this law so far (!!); the overtaxed judiciary, that itself is extremely dominated by male Bahuns, has come to a number of politically influenced and contradicting decisions and it has not enough contributed to break up the traditional structures that hinder the general participation of the people.

In this sense, one could be tempted into calling Nepal a failed state. But by doing so, one would fail to appreciate that the introduction of democracy in the early 1990s also has had positive effects. In this context, I would first call the fundamental rights that have more or less been well defined and guaranteed by the constitution. This has been the precondition that over the years many individuals and disadvantaged groups could fight for their rights. Many national and international human rights organizations have used this constitutional catalogue of fundamental rights for their valuable work, even though
they still have a hard time with the government as well as with the Maoists.

Q15. Please share your final words and rays of hope for Nepalese.

I see a very positive development from the point of the media. This has also to do with the guarantee of the freedom of opinion and expression as well as with the press and publication right, which are both part of the just mentioned fundamental rights. Today, the journalists are afraid neither of state nor of Maoist oppression and intimidation. This gives good hope for the influence and further development of civil society in Nepal.

I would like to mention the education system, which has come under heavy attack, especially from the Maoist side. Structurally, such critics may be reasonable and necessary, but in the way in which they are pushed forward by the Maoists, i.e. by constant school strikes that mean a total prevention of education for the youth, they cannot lead to a solution. Besides, these protests disregard the positive developments that have taken place in the field of education after 1990. The better and broader education of the masses has become the backing of growing resistance against the traditional establishment.

So, I will not yet call Nepal a failed state, despite all the above-mentioned malaise. The power and state forces (government, political parties, monarchy and army, opposition including the Maoists, judiciary) are constantly marching in a more and more negative way, but even small changes in their approach could again turn the development towards the positive. So, one should not give up hopes.

Mediation by the UN would definitely accelerate this process. But my hope his even greater in regard to civil society. The media that are not owned by the government are more or less on the right way, even though there is still numbers of papers that work against this process and uncritically accept and idealize the status quo. Also, a number of NGOs that work for the protection of human rights or for the rights of disadvantaged groups have done very positive work. Their peaceful procedure shows the only possible way that can lead to the development of Nepali society. I still would welcome a greater public appearance of academic circles, though a lot has changed in this respect in recent years, too.